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Ups and Downs in UN History 
Richard C. Hottelet∗ 
A peaceful world order was for centuries a noble, yet unattainable 
ideal, until President Woodrow Wilson called for action in the last 
year of the First World War. Sickened by four years of slaughter on 
the battlefields of Europe, the victors wrote a Covenant of the League 
of Nations into the Treaty of Versailles. It was the kiss of death. The 
Treaty was a nineteenth century peace—vengeful, greedy, and fear-
ridden, which registered only the absence of any ethical and political 
architecture for a new era. The Senate and the people of the United 
States promptly rejected both the Treaty and the League. Without 
America’s presence, the grand experiment stumbled down the scale 
into a melancholy farce. 
In 1941, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States 
took the initiative again, molding the wartime alliance of “united 
nations” into the world organization of that name. From the 
beginning, the United Nations (UN) reflected high hopes and stormy 
times, sometimes in a carnival mirror of weird distortion. Most 
importantly, at first and still, it showed that the United States was 
engaged in the international scene. President Harry S. Truman spelled 
it out in these words: 
If we fail to use the Charter and the organization we have 
created with it, we shall betray all of those who died in order 
that we might meet here in freedom and in safety to create it. If 
we seek to use it selfishly for the advantage of one nation or 
group of nations, we shall be equally guilty of that betrayal, 
but what a great day in history this can be . . .. This Charter is 
no more perfect than our own Constitution, but like that 
Constitution it must be made to live. The powerful nations 
 
 ∗  Former News Correspondent, CBS. 
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must accept the responsibility for leadership toward a world of 
peace.1 
However, it was clear even before the San Francisco conference 
adopted the Charter that an evil fairy attended this beginning as well. 
The Soviet Union intended to use the UN as its instrument. Openly 
violating Stalin’s promise at Yalta to permit democratic governments 
in Eastern Europe through free elections, the Soviet Union imposed 
communist regimes. Purging the Polish government took longer than 
expected; no Polish delegation made it to San Francisco. At one 
point, the Soviets insisted that the veto power cover also what the 
Security Council could discuss. The United States replied flatly that it 
would not join such an organization. 
I was present when this was put to the test at the Council’s first 
sessions in March, 1946 at New York’s Hunter College. Moscow 
refused to withdraw its troops from Iran as agreed and set up a puppet 
republic in the Kurdish provinces. When the Council took this up 
over his objections, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko gathered his 
officials and marched out. Several days later he quietly returned. 
In 1950 Moscow completely boycotted the Security Council and 
all other UN organs. It wanted China’s UN seats turned over to Mao 
Zedong’s communists, now in power on the mainland. But Stalin shot 
himself in the foot. No Soviet delegation was on hand to veto the 
resolution that allowed the United States to rally an international 
counterforce against the communist invasion and certain destruction 
of South Korea. 
Actually, Article 43 of the Charter envisaged armed forces 
contributed by member states and commanded by a Military Staff 
Committee of the Security Council. The Soviet Union never allowed 
it to form. Since 1948 this committee, comprised of senior officers 
from the five permanent Council members, has met monthly for an 
average of ten seconds and has done nothing but establish itself as the 
fastest gavel at the UN. 
Those early days were the organization’s preparatory phase. 
Several big East-West issues were not brought to the Security 
 
 1. Pres. Harry S. Truman, Address to the Delegates in San Francisco Who Adopted the 
Charter of the United Nations (on file with author).  
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Council. Others, such as the Berlin blockade, the rape of 
Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Hungary saw western resolutions 
vetoed by the Soviet Union. The UN learned to live within its 
limitations. The device used in Korea, a posse of like-minded nations 
under the authority of the Security Council, was a precedent for 
Desert Storm in 1991, as well as for Kosovo. The Kremlin bitterly 
resented Secretary-General Trygve Lie’s open support for the Korean 
operation and cut short his career, only to see him replaced by Dag 
Hammarskjold of Sweden. Hammerskjold won Washington’s 
gratitude by securing the release of eleven American prisoners of war 
in China. But he, in turn, lost Soviet support with his activism in the 
Congo. In summer, 1960 Moscow voted for a UN military operation, 
ONUC, to clear Belgian forces out of the old colony. That done, the 
Kremlin tried to establish a special relationship with Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba by sending Soviet equipment and expert help 
directly to him instead of to ONUC. Hammarskjold refused to allow 
this. Soviet Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev decided not only to bring 
him down, but also to prevent the UN from ever again cutting across 
Soviet plans. 
Seventeen newly independent nations joined the UN in the 
Fifteenth General Assembly. They raised membership to ninety-nine, 
giving what came to be known as the “Third World” the power of 
numbers and of violent rhetoric in the Assembly and subsidiary 
organs. Heads of government from the world came to this Assembly 
and Khrushchev made himself the spokesman of “decolonization.” 
African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, who came as Ghana’s 
Osagyefo (Redeemer), were seduced easily by his argument that their 
failings were really the fault of the old colonialists and the “neo-
colonialists”—essentially the United States. Khrushchev’s tactic, to 
gain psychological ascendancy in the Assembly, included plunging 
sessions into pandemonium by hammering his desk with his fists and 
his old brown shoe. He failed completely in his effort to replace the 
Office of the Secretary-General with a troika, but Hammarskjold was 
finished politically before his plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia in 
1961. 
The Bay of Pigs brought Cuba to the UN Security Council. 
Washington kept Adlai Stevenson, the new U.S. Permanent 
Representative, floundering in a welter of misinformation. He did his 
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eloquent best to argue that U.S. forces were not directly involved, but 
it was a diplomatic fiasco. The Cuban problem returned to the UN a 
year and a half later when the Soviet Union installed nuclear missiles 
on the island. At the Security Council presenting the evidence against 
the Kremlin, Stevenson asked the Soviet representative for a 
confirmation or denial. When Valerian Zorin scoffingly replied that 
he would not answer a prosecutorial question, Stevenson retorted that 
the Council was indeed a court of world opinion and that he would 
wait for the answer “until hell freezes over.” The UN’s role was more 
than that of a courtroom. Secretary General U Thant of Burma helped 
to pry the contending giants apart, proposing a moratorium, and 
facilitating the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. 
In December, 1963 one of those political volcanoes that shape 
human affairs burst through the paper crust of treaties meant to 
contain it. Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus claimed a treaty right to 
protect ethnic Turks from communal violence, a right Turkey 
invoked to seven years later justify a massive military invasion in 
another crisis. A UN Force, UNFICYP, sent to Cyprus in 1964 to 
discourage violence, remains to this day along a line that cuts the 
island in two. Political talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
communities began in 1968 and they stutter along still. The issue 
remains whether an independent Cyprus should be a federated state 
or only the loose confederation of two separate but equal ethnic 
communities. 
Nothing has affected the UN itself so powerfully as the Palestine 
conflict between Jews and Arabs. All the changes were rung in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as on the ground 
in violence and bloodshed, before Britain surrendered its League of 
Nations Palestine mandate to the UN on May 15, 1948. Cease-fires, 
agreed to and broken; UN mediators Ralph Bunche and Folke 
Bernadotte; UN plans and observation units; and new offensives and 
open war mark those years. So does one cardinal principle of Security 
Council decision. The Palestine Commission, created by the 
Assembly to carry out the Assembly’s Plan of Partition for Palestine, 
found itself an impotent spectator of open warfare. It appealed for 
help from the Security Council. However, the United States reminded 
the members that the Charter of the United Nations does not 
empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/4
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whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly 
or of the Council itself. 
By 1956 no basis for peace had been found. Arabs and Israelis 
remained violently divided. Britain saw Egypt’s new revolutionary 
leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, seize the Suez Canal. France, at war 
with Algerian liberation forces, was ready to join any anti-Arab 
move. Together with Israel, they invaded Suez on October 29. The 
United States, kept in the dark, summoned an emergency meeting of 
the Security Council. Two days earlier, Soviet troops attacked 
Hungary to crush an uprising for freedom. The two crises boiled 
together at the UN, but in different ways. Moscow refused to move. 
President Eisenhower persuaded Israel to withdraw from Sinai; 
Britain and France left voluntarily. The UN Emergency Force 
(UNEF), a largely Canadian idea with strong U.S. support, filled the 
vacuum. It was the first of the big, classic UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
Israeli-Arab relations lapsed into the fitful, snarling pugnacity that 
passed for normal. But Nasser became the champion of a new, anti-
Western Arab nationalism and in spring, 1967 and for reasons that 
remain unknown, the Soviet Union convinced him that Israel was 
mobilizing to attack Syria. The Soviet ambassador to Israel 
reportedly called on Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in the middle of the 
night. Eshkol, pulling on his pants, offered to drive him to the Syrian 
border. The Russian refused. The charge was false, but Nasser, in his 
leadership role, felt the need to respond somehow. He mobilized his 
army and ordered UNEF to abandon the buffer position it held for ten 
years between Israel and Egypt, in Gaza and on the Sinai Peninsula. 
He also closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping – as U Thant was 
flying to Cairo to tell him that this was a casus belli. 
The six-day war saw nonstop diplomacy in both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. The first objective was a cease-
fire. Some scenes were public and ludicrous. While Israeli tanks 
assembled on the Golan Heights for the short drive to Damascus and 
the Syrian ambassador pleaded in the Council for a quick cease-fire 
resolution, the gadfly Saudi Arabian representative persisted in one of 
the aimless, endless commentaries for which he was noted. 
Withdrawal was argued intensely in private. The Arabs, the Soviet 
bloc, and the Third World demanded Israel’s immediate departure 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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from the (read: all) occupied territories. Not until late November was 
there consensus on an Anglo-American formula—withdrawal from 
occupied territories, not specifying the extent or the timing but setting 
the principle of land for peace. The famous Security Council 
Resolution 242 was praised by many as a model of “constructive 
ambiguity” and accepted by all, but with conflicting interpretations 
that have kept a solution out of reach for thirty-three years. 
The UN remained the middleman in six years of small-scale, 
mostly aerial, warfare between Israel and Egypt. It was President 
Anwar Sadat who broke the mold, first sending his army forward 
across the Suez Canal to reassert Egypt’s position as a major player, 
then going to Jerusalem to tell Israel he wanted peace. The Camp 
David agreement and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty that followed 
were the work of President Jimmy Carter. 
Hopes were high after that and a certain stability emerged, due in 
large measure to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA). UNRWA has helped to feed, clothe, and educate the 
Palestinian refugee population that now numbers more than 3.5 
million in the Israeli-occupied territories, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. 
But there was no end of trouble as the conflict came to be primarily 
Palestinian-Israeli. A Palestinian Authority headed by Yasser Arafat 
was given parcels of land to administer, but Israel’s continuing 
settlement and mercantile policy in the territories, as well as 
appalling unemployment in the growing, youthful population, created 
a flammable mixture that flared up in mass violence in October, 
2000. 
The UN has transformed over the years. In the 1950s it was 
essentially a western club and the United States had little cause to be 
disturbed. Since 1955 new members, mostly developing and poor, 
swarmed in and the total membership today is 189. In the roughly 
twenty-five years before 1980, the radicalization of speech and policy 
in the General Assembly was a counterpoint of the Cold War. 
Denunciation of U.S. policy and of the United States was 
commonplace in debates, and American influence was seen to falter. 
President Lyndon Johnson and his ambassador to the UN, Arthur 
Goldberg, tried mightily to put peace in Vietnam on the UN’s 
agenda. They ran into a stone wall. Hanoi did not want peace but 
victory and it had the powerful support of the Soviet bloc. President 
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Richard Nixon pushed every diplomatic button to show Mao Zedong 
that Washington was strong enough to keep China’s seat in the hands 
of the nationalists. So obvious was this effort that when it failed in 
1971, there was jubilation on the floor of the General Assembly. 
Other incidents turned American public opinion against the UN. An 
Assembly resolution called Zionism a form of racism. And it was not 
understood that U Thant had no choice when Nasser ordered him to 
pull UNEF out in 1967. This turned the public against everything that 
started with the UN, including UNESCO holiday cards. 
Year by year Washington grew more critical of the UN, 
demanding changes in its structure and operations, and arbitrarily 
withholding assessed contributions for the regular budget and 
peacekeeping accounts to force the changes. Apparently unconcerned 
at being the UN’s biggest debtor or by the fact that most of the 
peacekeeping arrears are owed to other, mostly friendly, members, 
Congress pays at least enough annually to preclude the loss of its vote 
in the General Assembly. Successive Secretaries General and 
especially the incumbent, Kofi Annan of Ghana, elected in 1996, 
have held the budget steady, cut superfluous staff, streamlined 
authority, and tightened performance in a way that has earned the 
commendation of members, including the United States. 
In December, 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev came to the General 
Assembly to announce that the Soviet Communist Party had 
jettisoned class warfare. It was the official end of the Cold War. 
Gorbachev said that political disputes could not be resolved by force 
and he called for world cooperation. Soon the Red Army pulled out 
of Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the Kremlin worked with the 
United States on the Security Council to end the eight-year war 
between Iran and Iraq. Two years later, Russia joined a Security 
Council majority authorizing an international force to repel Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. It approved the rigorous sanctions intended to 
keep Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from again acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction. The sanctions regime is now crumbling. The Security 
Council is split. Iraq evades the UN’s sanctions and bars UN 
weapons inspectors. Saddam exploits the misery of his people to rally 
support worldwide for an end of all restraints. 
In the new phase that opened with the end of bipolar paralysis, 
there seemed new scope for UN activism. Secretary General Boutros 
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Boutros-Ghali responded to the start of the Yugoslav wars in 1991 
with the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, to safeguard delivery of 
humanitarian supplies to civilians caught in the Croatian, and then the 
Bosnian, fighting. In fact, it kept them alive until Serb extremists got 
around to killing them. President Slobodan Milosovic of Yugoslavia, 
embarked on the frenzy of ethnic cleansing that eventually led to his 
indictment as a war criminal, ignored all the UN’s resolutions, 
admonitions, and appeals to his better nature. The Security Council 
took no steps to stop him. It was only when NATO took control and 
bombed Serb positions that Milosevic came to Dayton, Ohio, to sign 
a peace agreement. 
Several years later, Milosevic was using the Yugoslav army 
openly in the mass expulsion and murder of ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo. Once again, NATO bombing backed by ground troops put a 
stop to it. The UN is now involved, together with European agencies, 
in a program of nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo—not to 
mention its superb effort in East Timor. 
The United States is officially and sharply opposed to nation-
building. That is strange in light of its own remarkable success in 
Germany, Japan, and Korea. However, with human rights in the 
ascendant, there is little doubt that this will increasingly confront the 
world community. Coupled with nation-building is the issue of direct 
intervention to deal with the disasters of broken-down failed states, 
often combined with intra-state conflicts. Kofi Annan underscored 
the United Nations’ dilemma: an organization of sovereign states that 
is dedicated to the protection and expansion of individual human 
rights. President Harry S. Truman would applaud Annan’s words of 
last year: “The Charter is a living document. . . . [N]othing in the 
Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond 
borders.”2 
At a Millenium Summit meeting of the General Assembly this 
fall, President Bill Clinton echoed these sentiments. Referring to 
internal conflicts which took five million lives in the past decade, he 
said: “This trend presents us with a stark collective challenge. We 
must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. But whether it is 
 
 2. Pres. Harry S. Truman, Address to UN General Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file 
with author). 
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diplomacy, sanctions or collective force, we must find ways to 
protect people as well as borders.”3 
 
 3. Pres. William Jefferson Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly (Sept. 6, 2000) 
(on file with author).  
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